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Abstract
Scientific realism is in part characterized by its epistemic commitment
to unobservables posited in science. To support such epistemic commit-
ments, some realists have argued that explanatory or theoretical virtues
that operates in tandem with inference to the best explanation can con-
stitute theory confirmation. I argue that there is a tension in the realist
epistemology between the idea that such virtues constitute theory con-
firmation and the idea that empirical discovery or detection of scientific
objects constitute significant theory confirmation. In particular, I argue
that the application of the realist framework in certain scientific contexts
yields a realist judgment towards undiscovered objects. Given such a
judgement, the potential empirical discovery or detection of such objects
would provide no additional epistemic warrant. The resulting picture is
that the realist epistemology suggests that science in principle does not
need to detect or discover its hypothesized objects in order to conclusively
confirm their existence. In order to avoid this situation, I argue that real-
ists should incorporate degrees of belief and a program of meta-empirical
confirmation theory into their overall framework.
1 Introduction
The project of scientific realism aims at establishing that we have rational rea-
sons to believe that empirically successful theories in science are true and that
their terms refer to existing objects. For some proponents of this view, the epis-
temic aims of realism is supported by inference to the best explanation (IBE).
According to this inference we have rational warrant to believe that the theory
that best explains, by virtue of a set of explanatory virtues, some collected data
is true. A given theory then, receives epistemic support from the application
of IBE. Another approach to account for the way in which evidence supports
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theory is Bayesian confirmation theory. According to this framework, a the-
ory gets confirmation only if the probability of the theory given the evidence
is greater than than the prior probability of the theory, i.e. its probability
before considering the evidence. While scientific realism is not incompatible
with probabilistic reasoning in terms of its overarching aims, some realists have
nevertheless argued against using it in their epistemology:
Bayesian reasoning does not have rules of acceptance. On a strict
Bayesian approach, we can never detach the probability of the con-
clusion of a probabilistic argument, no matter how high this proba-
bility might be. So, strictly speaking, we are never licensed to accept
a hypothesis on the basis of the evidence. (Psillos 2009, 195)
One can clearly see how there is a tension between the project of providing
epistemic criteria for accepting a theory as being true via IBE and the ”naked”
probabilistic conclusions given by Bayesianism. IBE, or what I will call ab-
ductivism, can then be viewed as an alternative to Bayesianism, Hypothetico-
deductivism and Inductivism as an account of theory confirmation and the re-
lation between evidence and theory.
In this paper, I argue that the Abductivist framework set up by Psillos (1999,
2000, 2007, 2009) in certain situations fail to attribute epistemic significance to
the empirical detection of a theory’s central objects. It does this because there
are contexts in which the application of abductivism leads to realist commit-
ments about the central objects of a theory despite the fact that they have not
yet been discovered. The structure of the paper is as follows: First, I outline the
notion of empirical confirmation by discovery and its epistemic significance. I
move on to present the epistemic framework - abductivism - of scientific realism
given by Psillos. I apply this framework to the dark matter hypothesis and show
that it results in a realist judgment with respect to dark matter despite the ab-
sence of its discovery. I argue that since dark matter has yet to be empirically
confirmed in terms of discovery, abductivism implies that its potential experi-
mental detection in the future would have no discernible effect on the epistemic
status of the hypothesis - if we should already believe that dark matter is real,
its discovery is epistemically impotent with respect to belief in its existence. I
consider a possible rejoinder that realists may offer to resolve the tension but
conclude that it leads to too costly problems elsewhere in the realist project.
In the final sections, I propose that realists could restore the epistemic signifi-
cance of empirical detection by integrating features of Bayesianism, specifically
degrees of belief, into their framework as well as integrating the program of
Meta-Empirical Confirmation (MEC) into their epistemology.
2 Discovery and empirical confirmation
Fundamental physics has for the majority of the 20th century been a success
story. Theories were constructed and tested empirically, pushing our under-
standing of the world forward at a staggering pace. Particle colliders were built
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to test theories in particle physics, astronomical observatories were constructed
to provide new data about the universe against which theories were tried, and a
variety of experimental tests of general relativity was conducted. This process
of empirically testing theories may be viewed as the ultimate arbiter for belief in
the (approximate) truth of those theories within the scientific community. Even
though scientists might have theoretical grounds for holding a particular theory
to be more viable than a rivalling theory prior to any testing by empirical data,
such theoretical grounds are rightly considered to be less epistemically probative
than empirical confirmation. There is a reason why physicists are seen celebrat-
ing experimental results with a standard deviation ≥ 5σ, or that vast amounts
of funding is directed towards building experimental facilities like the LHC in
CERN, the Tevatron collider at Fermilab or the LIGO and VIRGO gravitational
wave detectors - discovery and detection is our most powerful epistemological
tool to empirically confirm a theory. In virtue of the fact that discovery plays
this important epistemic role in scientific theory assessment, the standards of
statistical certainty have become increasingly higher. Franklin (2013) describes
the progressive increase of statistical certainty in physics as a way to epistemi-
cally grade results and distinguish between ‘discovery’ and ‘observation’ on the
one hand, and ‘evidence for’ on the other. In physics journals and communities
results ≥ 5σ are required to call something an ‘observation’ or ‘detection’, while
results < 5σ are labelled ‘evidence for’. This distinction indicates two things: i)
that empirical confirmation is held as the highest standard of theory assessment
and; ii) that detection and observation is the gold standard of empirical con-
firmation. Any reasonable philosophy of science then, should attribute proper
epistemic significance to empirical confirmation.
3 Scientific realism
Sophisticated forms of scientific realism holds that we ought to believe in the
reality of entities in so far as they are indispensable for the predictive success
of a scientific theory. The most developed account of this brand of realism
has been defended by Psillos, who has constructed an intricate and powerful
realist framework which contains defenses against the objection that inference
to the best explanation is not a legitimate epistemic inference from van Fraassen
(1989), solutions to the pessimistic meta-induction by Laudan (1981), and to
problems of transient underdetermination from Stanford (2006). One of the
tenets in realist defenses, also present in Psillos’ own, is the idea that explanatory
or theoretical virtues has a bearing on the confirmation and truth of a scientific
theory. (Psillos 1999, 171) This idea is expressed most clearly in tandem with
the epistemic merits of IBE.
3.1 Scientific realism and IBE
As a means to retrieve knowledge beyond the observable world, realists have
claimed that explanatory reasoning, or IBE, is the best option. IBE is under-
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stood by realists to be an ampliative method which confers warrant to believe
that the best explanation of the evidence is true. (Psillos (1999, 2000, 2007,
2009), Kitcher (1995)) Below follows a general schema of the inference:
D is a collection of data (facts, observations).
H explains D. (H would, if true, explain D.)
No other hypothesis can explain D as well as H does.
———————————————————–
Therefore, H is (probably) true. (Psillos 2007, 442-3)
Whether or not we ought to believe that IBE is epistemically defensible has
been one of the core issues in the realism/anti-realism debate for the past 20
years or so. van Fraassen (1980) argues that the proposed explanatory con-
nection between empirical success and truth fails to be established since two
mutually exclusive theories can be equally empirically successful. Explanatory
goodness then, is not a reliable guide to truth. Fine (1991) argues that the only
justification available for IBE is viciously circular since it involves a failure to
receive any external warrant: only IBE can justify IBE. While friends of IBE
like Psillos and Kitcher (see also Douven (2002) and Bird (2006)) have mitigated
some of these worries, one may still worry whether IBE overshoots the aim ex-
planationists intends to use it for. One of the big promises that explanationism
aims to deliver on is epistemic optimism: we have license to be epistemically op-
timistic with respect to sciences’ capability of reaching beyond the limits of our
senses and deliver knowledge about the world. While it is tempting to accept
the offer of bona fide knowledge about the external world, epistemic optimism
comes at the price of epistemic risk. The next section describes Psillos’ view on
the trade-off between epistemic warrant and epistemic risk.
3.2 Ampliation and Epistemic Warrant
IBE is an ampliative inference. For an inference to be ampliative just means
that it outputs conclusions which are logically stronger than the premises it uses
as input. The most commonly known ampliative inference is of course regular
enumerative induction, where the amplification is mostly thought of as purely
quantitative. IBE is an inference that is explicitly used in philosophical argu-
ment, for example in the familiar no-miracles argument for scientific realism as
given by Putnam (1975) and Boyd (1980), but it is also used in science. Being
an empirical endeavor, science regularly deal with generalisations and universal
laws and contains theories which infers causes beyond the observational evi-
dence. These are practices for which ampliative inferences lend themselves well.
There is, however, a downside to ampliation. The content-increasing nature of
ampliation means that its conclusions are susceptible to being false. Scientists
are not usually interested in universal laws if they are false or in postulated
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entities which are not real.1 While strictly false theories like Newtonian me-
chanics have their rightful place in the history of science, and can be seen as
important stepping stones to a complete picture of reality, they are no longer
contenders for being true. This is not to say that scientist have completely
abandoned it - its reliability in contexts where it is a limiting case is still intact
- but from the perspective of scientific realism, it is abandoned as a contender
for being true. Under the realist assumption that ultimately, science is not in
the business of aiming at false theories, it simply isn’t enough for an inference
to be ampliative, it also needs to be epistemically probative. In his defense of
IBE as a rational epistemic tool of science and scientific realism, Psillos argues
that ampliation and epistemic warrant are two desiderata in the definition of
the abstract characterisation of the scientific method:2
Any attempt to characterise the abstract structure of scientific method
should make the method satisfy two general and intuitively com-
pelling desiderata: it should be ampliative and epistemically proba-
tive. (Psillos 2009, 173-4)
The need for ampliation is simply that it is necessary if science is supposed to
go beyond what we already know based on ordinary sensory experience. The ex-
tra content is precisely what epistemic warrant is needed for. In his (2009) book,
Psillos provides an analysis of how enumerative induction and the hypothetico-
deductive method fares with respect to the two desiderata. Enumerative induc-
tion is argued to satisfy epistemic warrant, but only in a quantitative way. If all
observed A’s are B, then we may infer that the amplified conclusion that all A’s
are B’s is epistemically warranted. While ampliation is clearly involved, it may
be characterised as ‘horizontal’, meaning that the content that is being increased
is restricted to the kind of entity which one already have observed, so one is
not able to infer anything beyond the kind of entity one already know to be
observable. It is not able to introduce new ontology, for example, and so is not
ampliative in that particular sense. The H-D method is argued to be compatible
with both ‘vertical’ ampliation and epistemic warrant, but is, according to Psil-
los, too epistemically permissive: it has no discriminatory function viz-á-viz two
(or more) hypotheses which deductively entail the empirical data. The conse-
quence is that the application of the H-D method selects both (or all) hypotheses
which deductively entail the empirical data, leading to an underdetermination
problem. In Psillos’ terminology, enumerative induction is minimally amplia-
tive and maximally epistemically probative, while the H-D method is maximally
ampliative but minimally epistemically probative. The analysis of the methods
with respect to the desiderata highlights the dynamic between ampliation and
epistemic warrant:
1Scientists can, of course, be instrumentalists about theories in the sense that the reality of
the objects postulated in a theory is secondary to its utility as a predictive tool. In quantum
physics, for example, this stance has been legio for the past 50 years or so.
2One might reasonably argue that the project of finding a universal schema for ‘the scientific
method’ died with logical positivism (see Earman (1992) and Andersen and Hepburn (2020)),
but this issue is orthogonal to the issues currently discussed here.
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[A]mpliation is inversely proportional to epistemic warrant. This
is clearly not accidental, since ampliation amounts to risk and the
more the risk taken, the less the epistemic security it enjoys. (Psillos
2009, 182)
What is needed, according to Psillos, is a healthy balance between sufficient
ampliative strength and sufficiently robust epistemic warrant. It should come
as no surprise that Psillos argues that IBE strikes precisely this balance.
3.3 IBE, epistemic warrant and ampliation
The problem with the H-D method - that it can’t discriminate between multiple
hypotheses from which the empirical data could be derived - is precisely the
issue Psillos argues that IBE has the resources to deal with. This evaluative
function is grounded in the comparing of hypotheses with respect to a number
of theoretical/explanatory virtues:
Those hypotheses are ranked higher which a) explain all the facts
that led to the search for hypotheses; b) are licensed by the existing
background beliefs; c) are, as far as possible, simple; d) have unifying
power, e) are more testable, and especially, are such that entail novel
predictions. (Psillos 2000, 65)
That IBE can discriminate between hypotheses by selecting for their ex-
planatory virtues does of course not itself imply that the explanation that ranks
highest is epistemically warranted. In order to achieve epistemic warrant, Psillos
uses elimination of doubt with respect to the best explanation. That is, he uses
the absence of defeaters to provide prima facie epistemic warrant for the best
explanation. The two kinds of defeaters in play are rebutting and undercutting
defeaters. A rebutting defeater may simply be an observation that refutes the
hypothesis in question, and an undercutting defeater can be that several other
hypotheses can derive the evidence, making the probability that the considered
hypothesis is true significantly smaller.3 With respect to rebutting defeaters,
Psillos claims that since IBE, unlike the H-D method, is not an inference where
the evidence must be entailed by the hypothesis, one may attribute the incon-
sistency between observation and hypothesis to one of the auxiliaries. While
this may seem like gerrymandering, Psillos claims that unless there is some
other reason for abandoning the best explanation (perhaps the new observation
renders an alternative hypothesis the best explanation, or perhaps there are rea-
sons to think that new explanations will supersede the currently best one), it is
still rational to stick with the best explanation.4 With respect to undercutting
defeaters, Psillos argues that it is a problem which only marginally affects IBE.
Not every hypothesis that can derive the evidence offers any coherent explana-
tion of it, so only the hypotheses which both entails and explains the evidence
3Psillos description of rebutting looks very much like ordinary falsification.
4In this respect, Psillos’ framework is reminiscent of Lakatos’ program, where the core
theories are protected.
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will survive an initial screening. The ones that do will be evaluated with respect
to the above explanatory virtues. We may then have a set of alternative hy-
potheses which explains the evidence worse, in which case their presence cannot
be seen as epistemically undercutting the best explanation. Interestingly, Psillos
only briefly addresses the problem of unconceived alternatives (PUA) given by
Stanford (2006). PUA can be characterized as the anti-realist argument that
combine underdetermination and the pessimistic meta-induction. Underdeter-
mination is the idea is that a theory T is undermined by the fact that there
exist several alternative theories which are empirically equivalent to T, i.e. that
they are all equally compatible with the (available) empirical data. The pes-
simistic induction is the argument that many of the scientific theories believed
to be true in the past have been rendered false, warranting the conclusion that
current scientific theories are likely to face the same fate. PUA combines these
to argue that many theories in the history of science believed to be true were
thought to have no alternatives. These theories were later surpassed by newly
conceived ones. A pessimistic induction is then made to the conclusion that
current scientific theories are likely to have unconceived alternatives compatible
with the empirical data. Stanford’s argument targets Psillos’ characterization of
IBE because it latches on to the worry that the theory space containing empir-
ically equivalent alternatives is likely to also contain theories that explains the
evidence equally well or better than the theory currently selected by IBE. As a
response, Psillos argues that ”given the information available at a time t, it is
reasonable to infer to the best available explanation H of the present evidence
even if there may be even better possible explanations of it.” (Psillos 2009, 193)
I cannot see how this sufficiently blocks PUA since information about the like-
lihood that there might be equal or better explanations in theory space should
act as an undercutting defeater of the inferred theory in and of itself, especially
so since the inference is made to its truth. Given that PUA is an argument
that aims to raise the likelihood for unconceived alternatives, if it succeeds then
PUA provides precisely the kind of information that would constitute an under-
cutting defeater with respect to applications of IBE. As will become apparent
in later sections, PUA is related to the central argument in this paper, that
abductivism undermines the epistemic value of empirical detection, and so will
be revisited there.
Taking stock, we have an epistemic framework - abductivism - that takes
IBE to be the best characterization of the scientific method, involving the two
defeaters undercutting and rebutting. IBE then, uses theoretical or explanatory
virtues such that, in the absence of defeaters, we are licensed to believe that the
theory that scores the highest with respect to those virtues is (approximately)
true. The role played by the theoretical virtues, then, is confirmatory:
The rivals of realism, typically, deny that explanatory power has
anything to do with confirmation and truth: theoretical virtues are
pragmatic, rather than epistemic. Realists, typically, defend the
view that these theoretical virtues have epistemic force because they
are part and parcel of rational scientific judgement. (Psillos 1999,
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171)
Confirmation via explanatory/theoretical virtues is then taken to license
epistemic optimism viz-á-viz the theoretical constituents of the theory such
that we should think that they are real. (Psillos 1999, 185) The remainder
of the paper applies abductivism to the dark matter hypothesis and shows that
the idea that theoretical virtues can provide sufficient confirmation for realism
undermines the role of confirmation by empirical discovery or detection.
4 The astrophysical case for dark matter
Rougly, one may treat the dark matter hypothesis as the theoretical paradigm
committed to the idea that there is a kind of non-baryonic matter that inter-
acts gravitationally but not electromagnetically.5 The term ‘dark matter’ is
commonly attributed to the Swiss astronomer Fritz Zwicky’s speculative ex-
planation of the discrepancy between the observed rotational velocity and the
calculated gravitational potential of the luminous mass in the coma cluster. The
extra gravitational potential, he thought, must be due to some unseen ‘dunkle
materie’. At the time, he didn’t constrain his speculation to non-baryonic mat-
ter, but the general idea that additional low-luminous matter could explain the
observed dynamics as well as the coining of the phrase was enough to retrospec-
tively treat Zwicky’s work as the start of the modern history of dark matter. A
lot has happened since Zwicky’s first inference to dark matter, but I will focus
on three salient pieces of evidence in the literature: galaxy cluster dynamics,
flat rotation curves, and large structure formation. This covers both the astro-
physical and the cosmological evidence for dark matter and is sufficient to show
that realists overstate their epistemic optimism with respect to dark matter in
the subsequent analysis. I will largely follow the description of the evidence as
given by Bertone and Hooper (2018).
4.1 Galaxy cluster dynamics
In the 1930’s, Zwicky (1933) made a first attempt to determine the mass in
the coma cluster by applying the virial theorem to it. The first step was to
estimate the mass of the cluster to be the product of the number of observed
galaxies within it (800), with an average galaxy mass of 109 solar masses - a
number which was an approximation by Hubble. By estimating the size of the
cluster (106 light-years) he could determine the potential energy of the system
in order to calculate its kinetic energy and ultimately its velocity dispersion.
The velocity dispersion for 800 galaxies of 109 solar masses in a sphere 106
light-years across should be 80km/s, but the number Zwicky ended up with was
1000km/s. In applying the virial theorem, he concluded that the amount of
total mass present in the coma cluster was much higher than its luminous mass.
5I’m not considering here the recently (re)emerging proposal by Bird et al. (2016) which
suggests that dark matter could consist of primordial black holes.
8
Even as a first approximation, the high discrepancy implies that the dynam-
ics of galaxy clusters exhibit properties that where inconsistent with general
relativity - at those high velocities, the galaxies should not be bound together
in a cluster by the gravitational effects of their luminous masses, but should
simply disperse from each other. Additional observations and measurements
carried out by, amongst others, Smith (1936) and Schwarzschild (1954) further
emphasized a high mass-to-light ratio in galaxy clusters, adding to the emerg-
ing problem of mass discrepancy in accounting for galaxy cluster dynamics. In
short, the luminous matter we could observe was not nearly enough to account
for the gravitational bond manifested in galaxy clusters with the exhibited ve-
locity dispersion. Although several hypotheses were entertained as explanations
of the observed discrepancy in the mid 20th century, in the 1970’s the dark mat-
ter hypothesis emerged as the most plausible candidate to explain the observed
mass-to-light discrepancy. (de Swart et al. (2017))
4.2 Flat rotation curves
In 1970, Rubin and Ford Jr (1970) used an image tube spectograph built by
Ford in order to make observations of the Andromeda galaxy (or M31). Pre-
vious observations had been made using radio telescopes, but the improved
accuracy of Ford’s spectograph enabled a qualitatively increased measurement
of the galaxy’s rotation curve.
The rotation curve of a galaxy is roughly the plotted orbital speed of stars
and gas as a function of their distance from the galactic center. In smaller sys-
tems, such as our solar system, the orbital speed declines with distance so that
planets close to the sun orbit faster than planets further away. When analyzing
the rotation curve of the Andromeda however, Rubin and Ford obtained a ’flat’
rotation curve, meaning that the orbital speed of the stars and gas in it did not
decline with increasing distance from the galaxy center.
The rotation curves of two additional galaxies were plotted by Roberts and
Rots (1973), increasing the probability of a systematic discrepancy between ex-
pectation and observation, and in the late 1970’s, Bosma (1978) published the
results, and accompanying rotation curves, from radio observations of 25 galax-
ies, most of which displayed flatness out to the largest observed radii (Fig. 1).
Once again observations had established a discrepancy between observed lumi-
nous mass and gravitational effects in the dynamics of astrophysical systems.
Roughly, the phenomena displayed by the two astrophysical systems de-
scribed above imply an exclusive disjunction: either general relativity breaks
down at some arbitrary scales, or there exist some additional low-luminous
matter in these systems. The first explicit suggestions involving additional low-
luminous or ”hidden” matter that would explain flat rotation curves were made
in the 1970’s, following the work of Rubin and Ford (Freeman (1970); Rogstad
and Shostak (1972); Einasto et al. (1974)). Faber and Gallagher (1979) reviewed
the status of mass-to-light discrepancies in galaxies, in the abstract saying that
”After reviewing all the evidence, it is our opinion that the case for invisible
mass in the universe is very strong and becoming stronger”. The viability of the
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Figure 1: The rotation curves of 25 galaxies plotted by Bosma (1978), from
Bertone and Hooper (2018)
dark matter hypothesis as an explanation to the observed phenomena began to
gain momentum.
4.3 Dark matter and IBE
The realist position entertained in this paper argues that the best characteri-
zation of the scientific method is IBE. Since IBE is a method of inference that
selects between a set of hypotheses compatible with the data, one needs to ad-
dress the offered alternatives to the dark matter hypothesis. With respect to
explaining galaxy cluster dynamics, there were a number of competitors in the
running:
Indeed, well into the late 1960s and early 1970s many different so-
lutions to the cluster discrepancies were discussed. These included
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ideas about possible regions of ionized hydrogen; the existence of
a large number of dwarf galaxies; changes to the law of gravity; a
large density of gravitational radiation; cosmologically created black
holes; the notion that separate field galaxies could have been mis-
taken for cluster members; the presence of massive neutrinos; or,
finally, the possibility of observational errors. (de Swart et al. 2017,
3)
Similarly, the measured flat rotation curves in the 1970’s were not ubiqui-
tously argued to be evidence for dark matter. The two observations were rather
treated separately, having many proposed separate solutions. The dark matter
hypothesis only became the leading explanation to the observed anomalies af-
ter Ostriker et al. (1974) had proposed a cosmological framework in which the
missing mass explanation unified them. de Swart et al. (2017) argues that the
turn from observational anomalies to evidence was rooted in the fact that the
additional matter provided by the dark matter hypothesis helped cosmological
models satisfy a philosophically desirable closed universe (Ω = 1). This would
suggest that the epistemic boost given to the dark matter hypothesis was non-
empirical in the sense that the reasons given for its epistemic viability turned on
theoretical work in cosmology, driven by a desire for a closed universe. Whatever
the underlying motivations might have been, synthesizing the two problems and
giving them a single explanation is important to the application of IBE, given
that it operates with both unification and simplicity. Instead of treating cluster
dynamics and galaxy dynamics as two issues with two different data sets, there
is now a single data set that was best explained by the dark matter hypothesis:
There are reasons, increasing in number and quality, to believe that
the masses of ordinary galaxies may have been underestimated by a
factor of 10 or more. (Ostriker et al. 1974, L1)
For the purposes of applying IBE in this context, having a single explanation
which unifies the phenomena by reasoning that the dynamic behavior in the two
systems is simply different manifestations that share a common feature - the
presence of additional low-luminous mass - is key. Instead of having separate
explanations for each astrophysical system, there was now a single unified one.
The dark matter hypothesis explains both observations, it is licensed by existing
background beliefs in terms of being compatible with general relativity, it is
simple and unified the cause of the phenomena. It is precisely the hypothesis
that would be selected by IBE, in which case the realist would say that we
should believe that the dark matter hypothesis is true and that dark matter
exist, despite the fact that dark matter is undiscovered:
Not only has dark matter never been observed in accelerators, it
has also not been seen in direct detection experiments (in which
the recoil energy of a nucleus impacted by a dark matter particle is
observed) or in indirect detection experiments (in which the debris
from dark matter annihilations in space are observed). (Dodelson
2011, 2)
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If we take the realist epistemology seriously, this means that the detection
(direct or indirect) of dark matter is epistemically redundant for a realist judg-
ments with respect to its existence. The evidential situation is such that the
application of IBE outputs the dark matter hypothesis as (approximately) true,
entailing that dark matter exist. In this situation, and others like it, treating
theoretical and explanatory virtues as theory confirmation in conjunction with
IBE makes empirical confirmation in terms of discovery and detection epistem-
ically redundant.
4.4 MOND as a defeater
The realist commitment to the existence of dark matter was generated by the
application of IBE to the evidential situation as described above. There is,
however, an alternative theoretical framework that can derive and explain some
of the data to which the dark matter hypothesis was offered as an explana-
tion. If true, this would constitute an undercutting defeater as defined in the
realist epistemology, which in turn would eliminate the realist commitment to
dark matter. The core idea in the alternative framework is that general relativ-
ity’s description of the dynamics of mass and spacetime breaks down at certain
scales (associated with the astronomical systems described above), and that
we should replace it with a different set of laws. The first set of theories that
seriously explored the possibility of replacing general relativity was proposed
by Milgrom (1983). The core idea was to account for the problem of missing
mass in galaxies, i.e. accounting for flat rotation curves, by replacing Newton’s
second law, F = ma, in very low acceleration limits with F = ma2/a0. For this
reason, Milgrom’s theory and its succeeding variants are usually called Modi-
fied Newtonian Dynamics, or MONDs. It replaces Newtonian behaviour at low
accelerations with ”deep MOND” behaviour, meaning that high accelerations
systems (such as our solar system) acts according to classic Newtonian gravity
but low acceleration systems (such as galaxies) behaves according to modified
gravity. In the early days, MOND had two major problems: i) reconciling its
formal proposals with the conservation of momentum, energy, and angular mo-
mentum, and; ii) explaining relativistic phenomena such as gravitational lensing
and cosmological expansion. In attempting to solve these problems, MOND the-
ories went through several theoretical developments, resulting in Bekenstein’s
(2004) relativistic MOND-theory TeVeS (Tensor-Vector-Scalar gravity). TeVeS
is dynamical enough to potentially be consistent with gravitational lensing and
galaxy rotation curves, and is considered to be the most promising theory rival
to dark matter. Importantly, MOND theories reject the idea that there is any
missing matter - all gravitational effects that we observe is caused by baryonic
mass. So what we might call ‘dark matter effects’ is in this framework attributed
to baryonic matter, predicting a correlation between the two in systems with low
acceleration with remarkable precision. MOND theories, then, can potentially
suspend realist commitments to dark matter by undercutting it. As we will see,
however, there are explanatory reasons to reject MOND theories in favour of a
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dark matter explanation.6
4.5 Large structure formation
In the 1960’s, Penzias ans Wilson’s serendipitous discovery of the cosmic mi-
crowave background (CMB) ushered in the modern era of precision cosmology.
The CMB consists of the extremely redshifted light emitted in the very early
stages of our universe. With the increasing quality of data provided by COBE,
WMAP, and Planck, the emerging image resulting from the first free light in
the history of the universe has become increasingly clearer. When analysing
this data, cosmologists and astrophysicists have observed extremely small dif-
ferences in temperature between different spots in the otherwise smooth and
homogeneous CMB. These temperature anisotropies in the CMB is associated
with fluctuations in matter-density. Lower temperatures corresponds to higher
densities, and higher temperatures to lower densities. In the ΛCDM model
(where Λ= dark energy and CDM is cold dark matter), the density fluctuations
themselves are explained as a result of random quantum fluctuations which
were amplified by the gravitational effects of baryonic matter and dark matter.
Gravity pulled all matter inward, and radiation pressure due to the photons
pushed baryonic matter outward, causing the fluctuations to oscillate which in
turn made sound waves propagate - an effect known as Baryonic Acoustic Os-
cillation. Since dark matter does not interact electromagnetically, it could exert
gravitational influence without being affected by the radiation pressure, causing
‘gravitational wells’ which attracted baryonic matter (Hu and White (2004)).
As the universe expanded, it also cooled, and at a certain threshold, known
as the time of recombination, the universe was cool enough for previously free
electrons to couple with protons to form neutral hydrogen atoms. Since the
electrons could no longer interact with photons, this process enabled photons to
travel freely (this light is what comprises the CMB). The matter-densities due to
the Baryonic Acoustic Oscillations remained in their current state, ‘frozen’ as it
were, providing the initial seed structure of the large scale matter-distribution
we see today in the form of galaxies and galaxy clusters (Eisenstein and Hu
(1998)). Without the gravitational influence of (cold) dark matter, the forma-
tion of the measured fluctuations of matter-density cannot be explained, and
consequently, present day observations of large structures cannot be explained.
In fact, predictions by the cosmological model ΛCDM and the measured large
scale structure data from the Sloan Digital Sky Survey (SDSS) are in remarkable
agreement:
The imprint of the acoustic oscillations on the low-redshift cluster-
6There are a number of observations that have been used in attempts to falsify MONDs, for
example the decoupling of baryonic matter and gravitational potential in the the Bullet cluster
collision (Clowe et al. (2006)) or potential dark matter free galaxies exhibiting Newtonian
dynamical behavior (van Dokkum et al. (2018, 2019)). Although these observations may prove
to be important pieces of evidence in settling the score, there are currently some attempts of
accommodating the observations within a MONDian paradigm. An analysis with respect to
the ultimate impact of this evidence on MONDs will have to wait.
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Figure 2: The matter power spectrum, from Dodelson (2011). Red error bars
are data from SDSS, the thick black line is the prediction of ΛCDM assuming
general relativity and dark matter exceeding baryonic matter by a factor of 6.
Dotted blue line is a dark matter free model, the solid blue line is a relativistic
MOND model (TeVeS).
ing of matter is a generic prediction of CDM cosmological theory
(Peebles and Yu 1970; Bond and Efstathiou 1984; Holtzmann 1989;
Hu and Sugiyama 1996). Our detection confirms two aspects of the
theory: first, that the oscillations occur at z & 1000, and second that
they survive the intervening time to be detected at low redshift. The
small amplitude of the features requires that there exists matter at
z ∼ 1000 that does not interact with the photon-baryon fluid, i.e.
dark matter. Eisenstein et al. (2005)
The agreement between the data received from the CMB and SDSS and the
predicted values by ΛCDM needs to be reproduced by a MOND theory in order
to be a viable alternative to dark matter and general relativity. However, the
predicted matter power spectrum associated with Baryon Acoustic Oscillations
by relativistic MONDs are, as Dodelson (2011) says ”in violent disagreement
with the data” (Fig.2).
We may draw the conclusion that the phenomena of Baryonic Acoustic Os-
cillations not only is a remarkable prediction of the ΛCDM in which dark matter
is an indispensable component, but also that the dark matter hypothesis sub-
sumes yet another observed data set within its explanatory scope, one which is
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not explained by the rivalling theoretical framework of modifications to gravity.
For this reason, one can once again apply IBE to the extended data and add
novel predictive success for the dark matter hypothesis to increase its ranking
against the competition. I think there can be no doubts with respect to whether
or not the realist should be committed to the existence of dark matter despite
the fact that it has eluded every experimental attempt of discovery. The issue
for realists regarding the MOND vs dark matter situation is their characteriza-
tion of acceptance and truth. Once one has ranked how well the two alternative
hypotheses perform in relation to the available data and background theory, the
highest ranked hypothesis will be accepted as true. Since IBE, as characterized
in Psillos’ realism, does not admit of degrees of belief, this means that the em-
pirical detection of dark matter is superfluous to the rejection of MOND - if we
should accept that the dark matter hypothesis is true, we should also accept
that MOND is false.
5 A realist rejoinder
In response to the argument that abductivism fails to attribute epistemic sig-
nificance to the possible discovery or detection of dark matter, realists might
invoke a distinction between astrophysical or cosmological dark matter and par-
ticle physics dark matter. That is to say, they might say that the explanatory
virtues exhibited by dark matter with respect to the evidence from astrophysics
and cosmology does warrant realism about dark matter, but only as a general
existential quantifier. Since there is no evidence at all with respect to dark
matter in particle physics, there is no warranted belief that targets any specific
particle candidate in the class of possible contenders. While there are some con-
straints imposed on the class of possible dark matter particle candidates given
by the astrophysical and cosmological evidence as well as from unsuccessful
direct detection experiments, there is still a large number of different theoreti-
cal possibilities left, ranging from supersymmetric particles, extra dimensions,
weak neutrinos, hidden sector self-interacting dark matter, and so on. Given
the rather large class of dark matter candidates, the realist can point to a very
important and significant way in which empirical confirmation by way of discov-
ery can impact the epistemic status of dark matter - it tells us about the nature
and properties of dark matter. There is no reason to be realist about anything
more specific than the existential statement that there is some x such that it
causes the phenomena we observe, and therefore there is no tension between
the ideas that the existence of certain objects can be confirmed via their ex-
planatory virtues and the idea that the nature of such objects gets confirmed in
the process of empirical discovery. This response can be indirectly accessed via
Psillos (1999) discussion on the causal theory of reference of theoretical terms
over theory change:
[I]t is one thing to assert that there is an entity to which a term
t refers, quite another matter to find out the exact nature of this
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entity, and hence to specify the correct description to associate with
the term t used to refer to this putative entity. (Psillos 1999, 283)
I argue that there are at least two reasons for rejecting the realist rejoinder.
The first is that it relies too much on the fact that there is a large class of
possible dark matter particle candidates. Since this fact is contingent it does
little to reject the principled argument that confirmation by explanatory virtue
outstrips the need for confirmation via detection. The second is that such a move
is connected to a theory of reference which brings with it a host of problems for
realists with respect to theory change.
5.1 Trivial referential success and theory change
One of the problems facing realism is how theoretical terms can be taken to
successfully refer in light of substantial theory change. The realist project is
premised on a connection between empirical success and truth, and since the
successful reference of theoretical terms to ontologically robust objects is a nat-
ural consequence of this connection, successful reference in theory change is a
vulnerable point in the realist framework. The argument against realism is that
there are theoretical terms in past theories which, despite being empirically suc-
cessful, were nevertheless not referring to anything at all. Laudan (1981) has
perhaps most forcefully pushed this point against realists, arguing that past suc-
cessful theoretical terms such as ”luminiferous aether” are now abandoned and
considered non-referring.7 As a response to Laudan’s argument, realists adopted
a causal theory of reference that they thought could strengthen referential suc-
cess in cases where a term was successful but still abandoned.8 According to
causal models of reference, references are fixed existentially, usually by simple
ostension (Psillos (1999)). Given that ostension is a poor way to fix references
to unobservable objects, we may substitute it for the assumption that the cause
of some observed phenomena is associated with, in Psillos’ terms, a ‘physical
magnitude’. Given that we observe some phenomena with an unknown cause,
we can associate a physical magnitude to the cause with a term t. This moment
is then taken to be the introduction of the term t which refers to the physical
magnitude responsible for causing the phenomena. We now have a causal theory
of reference that seem to fix the existential reference of the term ‘dark matter’
as being introduced in order to explain the cause of galaxy cluster dynamics.
We may say then that this condition states that there is a physical magnitude,
an object or a structure, to which ‘dark matter’ refers. The nature and proper-
ties of that physical magnitude, however, can remain unspecified or be updated
once theoretical or empirical work has been done. For instance, in the early
1900’s, the use of ‘dark matter’ picked out a particular class of objects:
[A]stronomers at the time [1930’s] were open to the possibility that
large amounts of dark matter might be present in astrophysical
7See also Lyons (2006), Stanford (2003), and Elsamahi (2005).
8See Hardin and Rosenberg (1982) and Laudan (1984) for exchanges in this debate.
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systems, in the form of “extinguished stars, dark clouds, meteors,
comets, and so on”, as Lundmark writes in 1930.” (Bertone and
Hooper 2018, 18)
The modern use of the term rules out precisely those objects in favour of
some exotic non-baryonic particle(s). On a purely causal account of reference,
there is no tension between the early and the later use of the term since they
both satisfy the same causal role played by the term - exerting gravitational
influence. The causal account, however, makes successful reference too easy
to get. The early use of ‘dark matter’ referred to low-luminous macroscopic
objects made of ordinary (baryonic) matter and the modern use refers to non-
luminous, microscopic non-baryonic matter. Given that the two descriptions
of dark matter share no salient content with respect to the properties of the
object, the continuing referential success of ‘dark matter’ in terms of fixing the
reference existentially is inconspicuous. Laudan (1984) argues against the causal
account of reference on precisely those grounds - if reference is fixed purely as an
existence claim of an object as the cause of some phenomena, then the success of
that reference is guaranteed despite the fact that theoretical changes over time
attribute radically different properties to the object. Referential success then,
becomes a trivial matter, because the causal theory of reference is tailor made to
succeed. Additionally, Laudan’s argument in this context implies that it would
mean that Zwicky, Poincaré and others who used the term ‘dark matter’ in the
early 1900’s were actually referring to non-baryonic non-luminous particles all
along, which is clearly false. A purely causal account of reference will simply
not do. Psillos, well aware of the issues related to such an account, adds a
descriptive component to his theory of reference:
1. A term t refers to an entity x if and only if x satisfies the core causal
description associated with t.
2. Two terms t’ and t denote the same entity if and only if (a) their putative
referents play the same causal role with respect to a network of phenom-
ena; and (b) the core causal description of t’ takes up the kind-constitutive
properties of the core causal description associated with t. (Psillos 1999,
296)
The descriptive addition specifies that there must be some properties at-
tributed to the object such that it can play its stipulated causal role. But the
kind-constitutive properties associated with the core causal description of dark
matter must necessarily be informed by theory, and therefore go beyond the
mere existential claim that dark matter exists. It appears as though a defense
of the existential claim is coupled with the purely causal theory of reference
which, by realists own admission, is insufficient to handle problems associated
with theory change. Furthermore, one may worry about how to assess the core
causal description of dark matter in the first place, and whether there is some
overlap in the kind-constitutive properties assigned to such descriptions between
the theorizing of its nature in the early 20th century and current hypotheses.
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The history of dark matter is interesting as a special case of theory change
since one may treat the ontological disparity between the early theorizing about
its nature and the current theorizing as sufficient enough to categorize them as
different hypotheses altogether. On such a reading the term ‘dark matter’ as
used by Zwicky and others would be considered an abandoned term and not
continuous with the term as it is used today. On the other hand one may take
the perspective of the development of the dark matter hypothesis as analogous
to the development of the atomic model, where the term ‘atom’ can be consid-
ered referentially stable despite underlying changes in the ontology. But does
the realist have the semantic resources to deal with this special case? If we take
the ontological disparity between theories in the 1930’s and now as sufficient
for treating them as different hypotheses, we can represent the difference be-
tween the usage of the two terms as t for non-luminous non-baryonic microscopic
matter and t′ for low-luminous macroscopic ordinary mass. Under this inter-
pretation condition 2 (b) in the causal-descriptive theory of reference is fulfilled
because the putative reference of t plays precisely the same causal role that the
putative reference of t′ was supposed to play. With respect to 2 (b) however,
things are not so clear. Kind-constitutive properties are according to Psillos a
set of properties that the object necessarily must have in order to play its causal
role. Two questions now arise. The first is how scientists can determine which
properties an object which they have not yet detected must necessarily have?
The second is whether there is any sufficient overlap in the kind-constitutive
properties associated with t′ and the ones associated with t? The former ques-
tion suggests that scientists can, based on their current background knowledge,
find out the properties of an undiscovered object by reason alone which by its
own is unreasonable. The latter question is concerning because the only overlap
between the kind-constitutive properties of the putative entities of t and t′ that
one might reasonably argue exist is that they both should have the property of
effecting the dynamics of spacetime. Besides echoing the problems of the causal
theory, that the conditions for success is too easy to get when the criterion is
too vague, the kind-constitutive properties now just looks like the causal role of
the terms - what role does the kind-constitutive properties play in the causal-
descriptive account if they collapse into the causal role? In addition, this could
also mean that the structural changes to theories of gravity proposed by theories
like MOND would also count as denoting the same entity, given that it is also
captured in the kind-constitutive property of having an effect on the dynamics
of spacetime.
These are interesting and specific semantic problems for realism with respect
to the dark matter case and theory change, but for now, it is sufficient to point
out that the realist rejoinder is coupled with a purely causal theory of reference
which puts them in trouble regarding the general semantic issues of theory
change. This constitutes a good reason for rejecting the rejoinder.
18
5.2 Contingency, Completeness, and the case of Isomers
The interest in dark matter was for a long time during the 20th century re-
stricted to scientists working in cosmology and astronomy, where the scientific
status of at least the former had not been successfully established (de Swart
(2020)). The realization that the missing matter could be constituted by some
exotic form of particle(s) became a valid and important research question within
the particle physics community in the 1980’s, and has since emerged as the most
promising avenue for dark matter research (Bertone and Hooper 2018, 31). The
initial space of possibilities for what dark matter could be was by in large only
restricted by compatibility with the known laws of physics. Explanations of
the anomalies included suggestions that low-luminous astrophysical objects like
brown dwarfs, neutrino stars or black holes could account for the observed
gravitational effects. The different suggestions premised on the idea that larger
objects consisting of baryonic matter could constitute dark matter was collected
under the heading ”MACHOs”, short for massive astrophysical compact halo
objects. Although MACHOs have not been completely ruled out as being re-
sponsible for some of the mass budget of the universe, there ”is a consensus
today that MACHOs do not constitute a large fraction of the dark matter”
(Bertone and Hooper 2018, 44).9 The currently explored space of possibilities
then, has been restricted by both observations and theoretical considerations to
rule out baryonic massive objects.10 Does this mean that realists are committed
to the theoretical paradigm in which dark matter is a particle with properties
within a specified parameter space? Even if that is so, they may still claim
that their commitment is epistemically safe given that theory space is still rela-
tively large. This epistemic safety, however, is only circumstantial and is not an
effect of the realist epistemology, but rather of the contextual elements of the
situation.
The fact that theory space with respect to dark matter candidates has contin-
uously diminished demonstrates that the set of possible theoretical alternatives
with respect to dark matter (or any theory) is merely a contingent feature of the
situation. If scientists continue to rule out alternatives, consequently shrinking
theory space, a situation may arise in which there is only one possible candidate
left that can explain all the data. Supposing that dark matter has not yet been
directly or indirectly detected at such a point, we can more clearly see how
there is a principled reason to think that confirmation via explanatory virtues
outstrips the epistemic value of empirical confirmation via discovery. In fact,
there is an explicit reason to think that in such a situation, realists would be
forced to accept that conclusion:
Completeness: Suppose only one explanatory hypothesis H explains
all data. That is, all other competing explanatory hypotheses fail to
9See Bertone and Hooper (2018) for two salient pieces of evidence supporting this conclu-
sion.
10Again, Bertone and Hooper (2018, 43) briefly describes the theoretical and observational
reasons that impacted the restrictions on mass and self-annihilating cross sections.
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explain some of the data, although they are not refuted by them. H
should be accepted as the best explanation. (Psillos 2009, 184)
Completeness is taken to be an explanatory virtue by which we may judge
competing hypotheses against each other in applying IBE. As we have seen,
it can be applied at the level of theoretical paradigms so as to distinguish be-
tween the dark matter hypothesis and modifications of gravity, yielding a realist
judgement with respect to dark matter. In order to defend the limited existen-
tial claim, realist may resist the application of completeness internally to the
dark matter paradigm as a way to discriminate between different hypotheses
about the nature of dark matter and its properties. The possibility of doing
so, however, is necessarily linked with contingent facts of our knowledge about
the state of theory space. If a situation arises in which we have only one dark
matter candidate left, the application of completeness at the level of theoretical
paradigms will automatically select that theory, which provides a description
of the nature and properties of dark matter. The consequence is that the ap-
plication of IBE amounts to a realist commitment with respect to that theory,
regardless of whether dark matter has been empirically discovered or not. In or-
der to demonstrate that the hypothesized situation in the dark matter context is
not merely a philosophical possibility but rather a situation that scientists may
indeed face, one can consider an analogous situation with respect to explaining
isomers in the case of scientific atomism.
5.2.1 Isomers
At the turn of the last century, the scientific community were debating the
epistemic credentials of the theory of scientific atomism.11 Critics of atomism
argued, amongst other things, that the principled divide between the observable
and the unobservable rendered atomism a theory that could never be conclu-
sively confirmed, given that its core postulates were microphysical. Atomism,
according to this line of criticism, was a speculative theory with instrumental
value at best. Exponents of atomism claimed that its predictive success and ex-
planatory power should amount to significant epistemic support for the theory.
One, for our purposes, particularly interesting argument in favour of atomism
comes from late 19th century chemistry - the explanation of isomers.
Isomers are chemical compounds that consist of the same elements in equal
proportions but that nevertheless differ in their chemical properties. This pecu-
liar phenomenon in chemistry needed to be explained, and attempts at doing so
came from an atomist perspective. Both Le Bel (1874) and Van’t Hoff (1874)
theorized that if atoms were differently spaced in the molecular bonds in the
different isomers, this would explain the difference in chemical behavior. Inter-
estingly, the phenomenon of isomers appeared to only be explained by atomism:
First, in the absence of spatial positioning there seemed to be no de-
gree of freedom available at all to represent differences between sub-
11I refer to Dawid (2020) for a full case analysis of the situation with respect to the confir-
mational aspects of scientific atomism.
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stances that consisted of the same elements with same proportions.
Second, as had been observed by Louis Pasteur, different isomers of
salts of tartaric acid rotated the polarization axis of polarized light
in different ways. Given that light polarization was understood to
be a spatial phenomenon, it seemed difficult to imagine any physi-
cal representation of the effect of isomers on polarization that was
not based on spatial characteristics of the differences between the
isomers themselves. Once one conceded that the spatial character-
istics of the substance were crucial in both cases, it was exceedingly
difficult to imagine a representation of the spatial characteristics of
isomers that was not based on an atomist perspective. (Dawid 2020,
8) 12
In cases such as these, completeness could be applied to atomism in order to
yield a realist commitment to the existence of atoms even though no atoms had
been empirically detected. The situation implies that the later empirical detec-
tion of atoms would have amounted to an epistemically non-significant instance
of confirmation. The case of isomers show that a context in which theory space
is restricted to a single theory with no discernible alternatives is a very live
possibility in science. Presented with such situations, the realist epistemology
will treat the explanatory virtues of a theory as sufficient for conclusive confir-
mation of that theory with respect to its central objects and their properties. It
becomes clear then, that there is a principled tension between the confirmatory
role played by explanatory virtues and the confirmatory role played by empirical
detection.
6 A probabilistic turn
At this stage the issues related to PUA becomes relevant again, but in a rather
unexpected way. Given the above arguments, one way for the realist to resist the
charge of undermining the epistemic value of empirical detection is to claim that,
unless scientists detect the central objects of a theory, there is always a chance
that an unconceived alternative is the true theory. In such cases, there is still
room for empirical detection to make an epistemic difference. But as we saw in
previous sections, PUA is an anti-realist argument which can be used to weaken
IBE on precisely those grounds. This seems to leave the realist at an impasse:
either they accept that abductivism trivializes the epistemic value of empirical
detection, or they accept that unconceived alternatives undercuts the probative
force of IBE. I think realists could do well to look at probabilistic reasoning
in order to address both the problem of unconceived alternatives as well as
the problem of undermining empirical detection. Once one accepts degrees of
12The scientific reasoning in the quote can be taken to constitute a non-empirical way to
assess the theory in question, atomism, relative to its alternatives given certain restrictions on
background knowledge (that alternatives had to account for polarization effects for example).
As Dawid argues, no alternatives reasoning in the isomer case was in part responsible for
assessing the viability of atomism in lieu of the empirical detection of its central objects.
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belief, one of the tenets in Bayesianism, there is no risk that confirmation via
explanatory virtues outstrips the confirmatory role of detection simply because
one does not need to assert the truth of a hypothesis in response to the evidence.
So long as the probability of the hypothesis is lower than 1, there is always room
to increase its probability. The question is how, more precisely, probabilistic
reasoning can help the realist without also undermining its central promise of
epistemic optimism.
6.1 Non-empirical theory confirmation
If it is a fact that a given hypothesis is simpler, explains more facts, is more
compatible with background data et.c. relative to its rivals, it is not an empirical
fact that is logically connected to the content of the hypothesis itself. That
facts which are logically unrelated to the internal structure of a hypothesis
can have an impact on the confirmation of a hypothesis is not sui generis in
realist epistemologies. Dawid (2013, 2015, 2016) has developed and defended an
account of non-empirical theory assessment that addresses situations in which
the data needed to evaluate a theory empirically lies far beyond the current
limits of experimental physics. In such situations Dawid argues that we can
nonetheless assess the theory’s viability by analyzing its non-empirical features.
In this framework, the usual virtues such as simplicity, unification, fecundity
and elegance are not the driving force of the analysis. Instead, Dawid argues for
three distinct ways that non-empirical facts can bear on the confirmation of a
theory: the no-alternatives argument, the argument of unexpected explanatory
interconnections, and the meta-inductive argument. I will follow Dawid and
refer to the application of one or a combination of these as an instance of meta-
empirical confirmation (MEC). Could MEC be integrated in or added to the
realist overall epistemology in order to address PUA as well as the problem of
undermining detection? As we will see, the degree to which it can depends on
the context and particulars of the situation. Before we can address the contexts
in which it can, it is important to note that Dawid’s aim is not to claim that
MEC is equivalent with, or a substitution of, empirical confirmation:
[T]he distinction between MEC [Meta-Empirical Confirmation] and
empirical confirmation remains of crucial importance today because
it indicates a substantial difference in confirmation strength. Empir-
ical confirmation remains the only path to conclusive confirmation.
MEC is a second-best option that can be deployed under specific
circumstances as long as empirical confirmation is not forthcoming.
Even on the most optimistic current view on MEC this point remains
undisputed. (Dawid 2020, 15-16)
The reason why the distinction between MEC and empirical confirmation
does not collapse in the way that I have argued that it does for the realist is
because MEC is not taken to aim at assessing the truth of a theory. Instead,
MEC is a way of assessing the viability of a given theory (Dawid 2017, 8-9).
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The viability of a theory is of course not necessarily coupled with any realist
commitment to it, so the distinction is in no danger of collapsing. MEC, seen
in this way, is utilized to support substantially weaker claims than the real-
ist wishes to make. This, however, does not mean that the realist cannot use
the core concepts in MEC in combination with IBE and explanatory virtues to
good effect. The rational behind doing so would be two-fold. Firstly, MEC is
a framework that specifically aims to provide (some degree of) confirmation to
a hypothesis by analysing the state of theory-space. Such a framework can aid
the realist with respect to PUA. Secondly, it couches confirmation probabilis-
tically, in degrees of belief, which opens up the gap between confirmation via
explanatory virtues and confirmation via empirical detection. If realists could
successfully integrate MEC in their overall framework, this would fix two serious
problems in their epistemology.
6.2 The no-alternatives argument and realism
As we have seen, scientists may find themselves in a situation in which all the
known dark matter candidates except for one have been ruled out. In such situ-
ations the application of completeness and IBE prompted the realist conclusion
that the remaining hypothesis is true.13 This was worrying because it shows
that the realist idea that theoretical and explanatory virtues can have a confir-
matory impact on a theory in some contexts imply that empirical confirmation
is unnecessary or redundant for conclusive confirmation. At this point, uncon-
ceived alternatives presented an unwelcome way out for the realist: if there are
reasons to think that there are unconceived alternatives to the known dark mat-
ter candidates, the empirical detection of the remaining dark matter candidate
would have an impact on its confirmation. Recognizing that there are reasons to
think that there are unconceived alternatives is of course problematic precisely
because it blocks the epistemic warrant to believe that the confirmed dark mat-
ter hypothesis is probably true. Only if we had reason to think that the number
of alternatives is close to zero would the epistemic warrant be justified. This is
where the no-alternatives argument enters the picture. Let’s start with a brief
explication of the general concepts involved in the no-alternatives argument.14
For an H to have no alternatives means that:
Scientists have looked intensely and for a considerable time for alter-
natives to a known theory H that can solve a given scientific problem
but haven’t found any. This observation is taken as an indication of
the viability of theory H. (Dawid 2017, 17)
Even though Dawid speaks of the probability that a theory is viable, it
makes no structural difference would the realist simply substitute it for truth.
13In such contexts IBE looks more like what Bird (2006) calls ‘Inference to the only expla-
nation’.
14For proofs and a thorough Bayesian analysis of the no-alternatives argument, see Dawid
et al. (2015).
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Let Yk = {Y = k} be the expression that there are k number of alternatives
that satisfy the following conditions: fulfill a set of theoretical constraints C,
explain existing data D, and give predictions for future experimental outcomes
E . If we assume that Y takes a value in the natural numbers, and that FA
expresses the fact that no alternative H ′ satisfying C, D, and E , has been found,
then: P (H|FA) > P (H). That is, FA confirms H. The degree to which FA
confirms H depends mainly on the number of alternatives.15 If the number of
alternatives is low, confirmation is stronger, if it is high, confirmation is weaker.
The prior assigned to the value of Yk can be determined by meta-induction.
The meta-inductive argument provides reason to think that existing alternative
explanations to why scientists haven’t found an alternative theory, for instance
that scientists are not clever enough, are improbable:
[I]f scientists have been so successful in finding viable theories in the
past, it seems less plausible to assert that they are not clever enough
for doing the same this time. Therefore, MIA can turn NAA into a
method of significant confirmation. (Dawid 2016, 14)
MIA then, sets the prior probabilities of alternative explanations to FA suf-
ficiently low as to increase the probability of H. The no-alternatives argument
addresses Stanford’s worry that we have inductive reasons to think that there
are unconceived and empirically equivalent alternatives to any given theory by
providing reasons to think the opposite. For the realist, this means that the
successful application of NAA safeguards the epistemic warrant of IBE in rela-
tion to the known alternatives. If we have reason to think that there are few or
no unconceived alternatives, the probability that the true theory is amongst the
known ones and is selected for by IBE is greater than it would be without those
reasons. It also respects the epistemic relevance of empirical detection simply
because detection reduces the number of known and unknown alternatives.
One may re-frame and recap the issue as following. With respect to the dark
matter hypothesis, NAA can currently only be applied on the level of theoretical
paradigms. Scientists have been trying to find alternatives to the dark matter
hypothesis for over 30 years and still it is only MONDs that have been in the
running. If it turns out that no relativistic MOND model satisfies C, D, and
E , realists could take this to amount to an NAA mode of confirmation of the
dark matter paradigm. However, since alternatives within this paradigm are
many, NAA cannot be applied internally, which again leads to the core problem
of how to account for realism in this internal context without ending up in the
semantic problems described in section 5.1, or to see the resurfacing of the main
issue addressed in this paper: that one of the dark matter candidates receives an
increase in explanatory power or unification via some new observation and forces
the realist to conclude that its true. Again, allowing for degrees of belief is the
15Other factors are accounted for in the original argument: ”We should also note that the
value of FA — that scientists find/do not find an alternative to H — does not only depend on
the number of available alternatives, but also on the difficulty of the problem, the cleverness
of the scientists, or the available computational, experimental, and mathematical resources”
(Dawid et al. 2015, 10)
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obvious candidate for the realist. Once one introduces degrees of belief, there is
room for confirmation via both theoretical or explanatory virtues and empirical
detection, and in conjunction with MEC, this would substantially strengthen
the realist framework.16
7 Summary
In this paper, I argued that the application of contemporary scientific realist
epistemology to the dark matter hypothesis in cosmology highlighted a (princi-
pled) tension between the canonical idea that a theory is conclusively confirmed
by the empirical detection of its central objects, and the idea that a theory
can be confirmed by its theoretical and explanatory virtues. Realism, I argued,
implies that empirical detection is not necessarily confirmatory because in some
cases the application of theoretical virtues has already provided all the epistemic
warrant we need. I explored a possible realist response to the argument - that
realism was epistemically warranted only with respect to the existence of the
entity, not its nature and properties - but concluded that such a general claim
was hard to reconcile with the semantic theories regarding successful reference
that realists have developed in response to challenges from theory change. De-
veloping the realist response also made the problem of unconceived alternatives
reappear in a, for the realist, new context. I then explored if abductivism could
be strengthened by embracing degrees of belief as well as a program of meta-
empirical confirmation, or MEC. The integration of the two looked promising for
two reasons: i) degrees of belief principally upholds the relevance of empirical
detection, and; ii) MEC strengthens IBE with respect to the known alternatives
by addressing the problem of unconceived alternatives.
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